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Showing posts with the label eurozone

The myth of internal devaluation and of competitiveness after Grexit (also in Greek)

Perhaps, I am seeing things the wrong way, but here is my thought: Following the 5th review of the IMF  and Athanasoglou (2011, Chart4, p.11)  on "The role of product variety and  quality and of domestic supply in foreign trade"  it is more than obvious that Greek firms are the largest importers. That is to say, Greece imports, heavily, factors of production other than labor. So, if Greece's non-labor production factors come from abroad, their prices are, also, set abroad... Therefore, the Greek firms may find it rather difficult to reduce their costs - no matter how labor cost might (?) be reduced - since the non-labor costs are set abroad. With firms finding difficult to reduce their costs, they will, subsequently, find it difficult to reduce their prices. This is a reason why prices did not deflate as wages did, so far, and why the the trade balance ameliorated mostly by the reduction of imports following the contraction of income and economic ...

The failing "success story"...

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We reed at Reuters that  "Greek stocks plummet as bond yield surge threatens bailout exit" ! The over optimism of the Greek government turned out to be a huge bomb they have been playing with for a very long time. Perhaps, in an attempt to shape expectations, or to tame the animal spirits...  Anyway, as I wrote a few months earlier the borrowing cost was,  is and will remain   prohibitive  for a very long time. Until we raise adequate budget surpluses to finance our debt obligations, including annual interest payments, we cannot cut all ties with the IMF. Why particularly the IMF? Because, our Euro partners will find it hard to convince their tax payers to fund us even more, and the markets know that.  Added to the enormous borrowing cost, considerable political unrest is about to unveil. Naturally, after almost five years of continuous social turmoil - increasing unemployment, poverty, social exclusion, income losses - it would be naive to expect...

No Supply-Demand laws for the Public Debt markets?

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There is some concern about the anticipated QE from the ECB, with respect to the public debt yields (e.g. Reuters article ). In other words, there is some widespread (?) concern that Eurozone bond yields will rise due to higher inflation expectations following the highly awaited intervention of the ECB. Expectations matter, but what about the Supply & Demand Laws? If we take under consideration the vast shift in the demand for bonds, their price will move upwards and, hence, their yields will fall. This is what happened in the US following each QE. So, inflation has been firmly tamed and both long-term and short-term Government debt yiels have decreased.  Is there any case with monetary expansion accompanied with increases in Government's cost of borrowing while GDP being way off course?

Betting on expectations...

It has been a while since the public discourse of the "success story" begun, generating discussions over whether there is some short of success or not and, if yes, to what extent. Anyway, I am with those who strongly believe that there is no "success story" at all to talk about . However, there is something that I have failed to pay attention to: the expectations and the way they make the economy - and the world - move. Expectations play a very important role in any economy and, although they do not constitute the main nor the major factor of economic (both financial and non) incidents, they can make scenarios materialize that otherwise would not; mostly through a self-fulfilling prophecy.  What am I trying to suggest? That the only reason why our prime minister might argue for a success (story) is to create the perception that the ongoing reforms have begun bearing fruit and subsequently to form the expectation that economic environment is going to improve. Appa...

Surprising news!!! (NOT..)

It is a real shock if you live in a parallel universe of your own... (News initially read at Naftemporiki )

The economics of the "success story"

There is something I need to admit... I am sick of the so called "success story" and the naive- false and deceitful, if you are as malicious as I am- declarations of the opposition. Here are the facts: During 2008, Greece produced goods and services of 240 bn euros. During the period April 2012- March 2013 GDP in current prices was 190 bn euros ( EL.STAT .). By the end of March 2013 the debt of the Central Government was 309 bn euros ( Ministry of Finance ), i.e. 161% of Greek GDP.  Additional measures need to be taken in order to make sure that the Central Government debt will be less than 110% of GDP by 2022. The most auspicious scenario is that the current taxation will remain unchanged for at least until 2015 with the hope that recession will deescalate. Anyway, I do not really believe that there is any more space left for heavier taxation. On the other hand, we are still missing the big picture: while oscillation between anemic growth and periods of recessions ten...

Euro area: A few alternatives.

Many times, the private debates in which I have participated have been fueled by the debt and the banking crisis and the imminent recession. What went so uglily wrong? What should have been done? Is it too late? Can things take a turn for worse?  Firstly, it is essential to unfold the exact chain of events the way I apprehend it based on my knowledge of economic theory. Everything began in 2007-2008 when the financial sector of the US devastating losses following the collapse of both the sub prime lending and its securitization and gradually the rest of the world was infected. After Lehman Brothers everyone realized that there was nothing to end painlessly. In their effort to prevent a broader contamination, governments borrowed large sums in other to strengthen the balance sheet of the banking and financial sector and safeguard their economies. Put differently, tax payers are asked to pay for a risk they never undertake and for which they never compensated. Nations with we...

What the "assessment of a realist" really tells us!

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I would like to communicate my thoughts- fruits of my inexperienced existence and humble opinion- as far as "Eurozone cross-fire: the way out of economic recession - Assessment of a realist and a response to idealists and cynics"  by Jörg Asmussen. First of all, no one would be that naive as to accuse the board of the ECB of being the reason of today's debt-crisis. ECB is doing its best while complying with its mandate and a s a matter of fact it can indeed perform much better but it is not allowed to do so.  The fact that our central bank should have played a different, more active, role is a matter of political choice made by the European leaders and hence only the latter can be blamed for the current function of the ECB. So, critics targeting ECB, most probably do not target the governing body of the ECB but these who defined on what they should focus. Below, you may browse the nominal World GDP and beneath that a stacked line chart of the exports of Greece, Portu...

Back and forth in the Debt Statistics port.

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The dream of a united Europe dates back in 1951 in the form of the "European Coal and Steel Community" (ECSC). 41 years later, on February 7, the 12 members of the EU signed the Maasticht Treaty probably a treaty with the most lethal omissions, lethal for the future of EU. During all the years following the Maastricht Treaty even more mistakes were made and are currently being made and more facts were neglected. Currently, we are playing down the spill-overs of austerity policies while we are concentrated in maintaining a "lower than, but close to, 2% inflation in the mid-term", like a ship being trapped in a port without the crew knowing that they have actually been trapped... Decisions were made as if the only economic variables that could hamper economic growth and social prosperity are debt and inflation. Given that false, sometimes rather naive, perception and regardless the 5 year long inert growth of Euro area we are still focusing on "sound governmen...

"The role of monetary policy in addressing the crisis in the euro area": A few ambitious notes.

I would like to point out a few thoughts of mine with respect to a speech by Mario Draghi on April 15, 2013; " The role of monetary policy in addressing the crisis in the euro area ". Firstly, it is the controversial Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). OMT was announced by Draghi on September 6, 2012 . When I first heard the news I couldn't believe my ears and I watched the whole press conference. After that I was kind of emotionally overheated believing that Mario Draghi crossed the Rubicon and Euro area would never be the same again! A few months later my expectations dashed. What happened is that I fooled my own self by playing down the condition of ESM involvement... So far the unlimited bond buying mechanism has never been activated; bank deposits haircut is on its way instead. ECB is not allowed to finance sovereign debt; it is a matter of credibility. Indeed... But the question that needs an answer is how credible our banking system and our hard currency is n...

Scylla and Charybdis: Arguing for the second best.

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I honestly have to admit that I never was, and I hope I will never be, a supporter of the EMU dissolution, or of the exit of any member-state from the Euro. I have previously expressed myself as far as Cyexit is concerned and I am not intending to reconsider my views. When Krugman wrote that the only solution left for Cyprus given the current circumstances is quiting Euro  I started thinking about debt dynamics, currency in circulation, destabilization, spillovers, etc. A couple of hours later Krugman described Cyrpus being between Scylla and Charybdis  and as a matter of fact Cyprus is indeed between the two monsters of Greek Mythology.  The main argument is that by cutting a deal with troika austerity measures- the one and only panacea- will be implemented, Cypriot economy will dip into recession and thus debt will become explosive. Correct! Absolutely correct!  I believe that everyone who has at least some non-neoclassical logic left would agree. Below,...

Economic complications of a Cyexit

Over the past few days, the Cyexite scenario has been communicated several times, either via journalists or bloggers and some other times as a leverage for negotiations... I shall  examine some implications of this undesired though improbable- if you ask me- scenario First of all, Cypriot firms, both financial and non-financial, and households have issued debt denominated in Euro, such as loans, bonds, commercial credit, cheques etc. Then, in case Cypriot pound (CP) substitutes for euro a practical question arises: the just mentioned debt will be repaid in what currency? If some of you see an obvious answer, please take some time to reconsider your thoughts. First of all, the debt holder will have to agree to be paid back in an other that the agreed currency and then he will have to negotiate the exchange rate this will happen (for now let us ignore the exchange rate related problems). On the other hand, the debt issuers, will have to find adequate funds to pay back its borrower...

ECB: Independent or political leverage? No-one can tell for sure!

After the ultimatum issued by the ECB  one might wonder about the independence of the ECB and its subsequent credibility. Is the orchestrator of the Eurosystem really independent, conditionally independent or totally dependent to the political agenda of any given moment? Its dependence or independence extends to which degree? First of all, the direct funding of public sector, i.e. public debt, is prohibited in the name of the credibility and independence of a central bank (here, the ECB). I must admit that I do not rigorously disagree with the necessity of independence, at least under certain circumstances. What about when a central bank is used as a leverage to political negotiation? What about when the central bank (any given one) turn a blind eye to imminent systemic risks of extended destabilization? What are the motives of this attitude? Why all of the ECB controversial measures have been proven to be cripple so far? When the monetary authority does not seem annoyed at al...