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Why 2020 is different to the 2008 global financial crisis?

Following the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent lockdown measures pursued by most nations, economic activity has plummeted. US jobless claims ( link ) and UK universal credit claims ( link ) have reached unprecedented levels. These claims measure how many employees lose their jobs. However, I argue below why this measure is not indicative of the length of the economic downturn. Why is this crisis different than the most recent sizeable downturn of 2008? Mainly for two reasons. Firstly, there is no credit crunch for the time being. Secondly, the target of the government expenditure is different. Beginning with the credit conditions, as opposed to 2008, banks still lend each other and if they don’t the central banks will offer ample liquidity. Therefore, banks can continue provide credit to the economy or at least they are not forced to completely stop as in 2007-2008 following the collapse of the Lehman Brothers. The basic function of credit is to transfer income from the futur
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The myth of internal devaluation and of competitiveness after Grexit (also in Greek)

Perhaps, I am seeing things the wrong way, but here is my thought: Following the 5th review of the IMF  and Athanasoglou (2011, Chart4, p.11)  on "The role of product variety and  quality and of domestic supply in foreign trade"  it is more than obvious that Greek firms are the largest importers. That is to say, Greece imports, heavily, factors of production other than labor. So, if Greece's non-labor production factors come from abroad, their prices are, also, set abroad... Therefore, the Greek firms may find it rather difficult to reduce their costs - no matter how labor cost might (?) be reduced - since the non-labor costs are set abroad. With firms finding difficult to reduce their costs, they will, subsequently, find it difficult to reduce their prices. This is a reason why prices did not deflate as wages did, so far, and why the the trade balance ameliorated mostly by the reduction of imports following the contraction of income and economic activity. M
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Greek Credit Institutions: Liquidity constrained?

Been away for a while due to studying commitments... Following the decision of the ECB about the eligibility of the Greek bonds , I was initially panicked, too. However, after Karl Whelan's post things got straight. Now that I, finally, have some time, I checked the  balance sheets of the four largest  Greek Banks, from the 3rd Quarter (September 30,2014), with respect to the eligibility of collateral for weekly ECB MROs. These are the results, as well the depositsthese Banks owe: Piraeus Bank Group (in millions of Euros) ( link ) Greek Sovereign Debt: 567.1  Other Countries Government debt: 358.5 EFSF bonds and non- Greek IOUs: 14, 438.4 Deposits (Liability): 54, 824 On Sep. 30, 2014 the outstanding repo transactions - MRO, LTRO - with the Eurosystem (ECB & BoG) was 10 bn EUR; that is the Piraeus Banks had, at that time, absorbed liquidity of approx 10 bn from the Cebtral Bank - so, not that dependent after all. Group of the National Bank of Greece (in millions
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Monetizing Eurozone's Sovereign Debts: it is now or never

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So, Mario Draghi said that an inflation much lower than 2% is against his mandate. And it is! If you ask me, early 2015 is the right time, if not too late, to buy sovereign bonds. Let me, please, tell you what I think. First of all, given that Eurozone economy is below its potential, inflation risk will remain low, and the zero lower bound will prevent monetary policy to be "hazardously" inflationary. But, this is an argument why we should not fear of inflation, if the ECB decides to take bold action. True! For now... Moreover, given that we remain below our potential output, member states have begun to deviate from austerity and call for more expansionary budgets. Sooner or later, they will start creating budget deficits as a mean of expansion. And this has two implications. The first one, which relates to my previous argument is that budget deficits will boost expansion, and, hence, the return to the potential output. Therefore, the later the ECB decides to act, the mo
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"Asset inflation" aka a transmission channel

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Asset values have been rising somehow intensively, following amid liquidity injection (QE) by major Central Banks over the last few years. A controversial, yet rather effective, policy choice. And this controversy, currently, derives from the asset bubble argument. In other words, the increase in the value of assets is a bubble, and, inevitably, it will burst. Is this policy controversy well justified? Perhaps, not very well. I will not argue whether asset inflation is a bubble or not. That is not the point I am trying to make.  I will argue, however, that the rising asset values is exactly how the whole policy should work! It is a key mechanism of transmitting monetary policy to the real economy. Not only for banks, but for households, as well. If you own assets, their value rises your net value rises, too, and, hence, you can borrow more or/and at a lower cost. Most importantly, households and businesses can remain solvent while deleveraging stops, and their liabilities rise.
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Andiamo, Italiani!

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While French Hollande is ready to negotiate for pro-austerity, "fiscal consolidation" if you will, others take serious steps for the best of the entire Eurozone's interest. Mario Draghi is (claims to be) ready to take bold action against deflation threat  ( Reuters ),  and Matteo Renzi publicly denouncing budget cuts in a recessionary environment ( Le H uffington Post ). Both are in the trenches with Berlin. At the same time, the rest of the leaders are conspicuous by their absence. I do not know anything about politics, but while the "fiscally sound" Eurozone failed to ram unemployment, an actual human index, the US did far more better job. The "cost" of fully recovering from recession was an approximately 9% of GDP additional debt burden for the US. Hopefully, Euro leaders will realize that unemployment is far more important than fiscal soundness, before it's too late!
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The failing "success story"...

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We reed at Reuters that  "Greek stocks plummet as bond yield surge threatens bailout exit" ! The over optimism of the Greek government turned out to be a huge bomb they have been playing with for a very long time. Perhaps, in an attempt to shape expectations, or to tame the animal spirits...  Anyway, as I wrote a few months earlier the borrowing cost was,  is and will remain   prohibitive  for a very long time. Until we raise adequate budget surpluses to finance our debt obligations, including annual interest payments, we cannot cut all ties with the IMF. Why particularly the IMF? Because, our Euro partners will find it hard to convince their tax payers to fund us even more, and the markets know that.  Added to the enormous borrowing cost, considerable political unrest is about to unveil. Naturally, after almost five years of continuous social turmoil - increasing unemployment, poverty, social exclusion, income losses - it would be naive to expect political stabilit
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